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Negligence: Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hospital:
Taming the Monster of Corporate Negligence or Creating
an Unpredictable Form of Hospital Liability?
I. Introduction
Since the turn of the century, medical technology has advanced with herculean
strides.' The increasing complexity of healthcare issues accompanying these
advances has called upon the legal community to keep in step.2 At the same time,
hospitals have evolved into modem, healthcare-providing businesses,3 facing everexpanding liability.4
This trend of increasing hospital liability has culminated in the widely adopted
and loosely defined doctrine of corporate negligence.5 However, an uneven and
inconsistent application of the doctrine's precepts has produced an evolving
creature,6 not unlike Dr. Frankenstein's "monster," which was assembled from
mismatched members and sewn into one body.7 Many courts and commentators
accept corporate liability as encouraging a higher quality of patient care.8 The

1. See ARTHUR SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION 539 (2d
ed. 1988).
2. For a discussion of policies and legal doctrines arising in the midst of medical advancement, see
CLARK C. HAVIGHURsT, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 581-87 (1988).
3. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 430-32 (1982)
(describing the shift in the public perception of hospitals to that of sophisticated businesses, providing
multiple health services); see also William B. Smith, HospitalLiabilityfor Physician Negligence (Law
and Medicine), 251 JAMA 497,497-98 (1984) (noting that as hospital equipment became more complex,
more powerful, and more sophisticated, the hospitals exposure to the risk of liability increased
accordingly).
4. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (acknowledging
that the community hospital has assumed the role of a comprehensive health center ultimately responsible
for arranging and coordinating total health care); see also David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper:
Third-Part Payor Liability for Medical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861, 896-97 (1991)
(explaining that the public's perception of the modem hospital as a comprehensive health facility
promoted the application of corporate negligence to hospitals).
5. See generally Cassandra P. Priestley, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Independent
Contractors: A Summary of Trends, 50 J. Mo. B. 263 (1994) (describing the almost unanimous
acceptance of the jurisdictions considering corporate negligence and the variety of forms it has taken).
6. See Gerry Gressel, Note, Albain v. Flower Hospital: Halting the Expansion of Hospital liability
for Negligence of Physicians in Ohio, 19 N. KY. L. REv. 393, 402-03 (1992). The author notes the
inconsistency in refusing to broadly define a hospital's independent duty while insisting that hospital
administrators are qualified to supervise employee physicians). Id. at 402.
7. See MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (New Am. Library ed. 1965) (1818).
8. See John F. Bales & Lisa A. Demarco, Selected Topics in Medical Malpractice Litigation, in
HEALTH CARE LAW 1993, at 381, 471-85 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 669, 1993), available in Westlaw, 669 PLI/Comm 381 (describing the holdings of some of the courts
of jurisdictions deciding the issue of corporate negligence). For a review of some of the jurisdictions
accepting corporate negligence, see Insinga v. Labella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989).
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doctrine's unpredictability, though, has left hospitals confused and exposed to a
greater risk of liability.'

On February 14, 1995, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma followed this trend and
formally adopted corporate negligence as a viable theory of hospital liability.

According to this ruling, a hospital owes an independent duty to its patients to
ensure that only competent physicians are granted staff privileges." Further, once
staff privileges are granted, a hospital has a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure
patient safety when it knows or should have known that a physician has demonstrated a pattern of incompetent behavior. As a result, the court adopted a more
limited version of the corporate negligence doctrine than has been applied in other
jurisdictions. 3
This note will first explore the development of hospital liability, from the origins

of charitable immunity through the present-day imposition of corporate responsibility. Second, the fact3 of Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hospital Trust Authority4

will be presented, as well as an analysis of the court's holdings. Third, the limited
form of corporate liability adopted will be examined and supported as an

evenhanded and timely expansion of existing hospital liability theories. Finally,
alternative guidelines by which a hospital's standard of care may be defined will be
discussed and evaluated.
I. HistoricalEvolution of the CorporateNegligence Doctrine

For the greater part of a century, 5 the doctrine of charitable immunity released
hospitals from accounting for tort liability. 6 Public policies affirming the hospital's
role as a nonprofit charity, however, grew outdated as hospitals developed into

9. See David H. Rutchik, The Emerging Trend of CorporateLiability: Court's Uneven Treatment
of HospitalStandardLeaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 535, 571 (1994).
10. Strubhart v. Perr, Memorial Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263, 266 (Okla. 1995).
11. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 276.
12. Id. Hospitals shall be held liable by a showing that the staff physician's negligence was
foreseeable, id. at 277, evidenced by a pattern of incompetence which puts the hospital on notice to take
reasonable steps to protect patients, id. at 278. The court declined, however, to place a strict duty on
hospitals to cancel privileges whenever a physician's incompetence is called into question. Id. (citing
Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045-46 (Ohio 1990)).
13. Id. at 278.
14. 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
15. The charitable immunity doctrine was first applied in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
120 Mass. 432 (1876), and was expressly rejected in Oklahoma in Gable v. Salvation Army, 100 P.2d
244 (Okla. 1940). The MDonaldcourt based the doctrine on a trust fund theory that donations should
not be diverted to award camages from the intended purpose of freely administering charity. Thompson
v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. 1991).
16. See Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (reasoning that
if a hospital must account for tort liability, then its ability to provide care without regard for a patient's
ability to pay would be hindered); see also Priestley, supra note 5, at 263 (outlining four theories as the
basis for charitable immunity).
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sophisticated businesses. 7 Courts eventually rejected this doctrine, favoring instead
respondent superior."5
Although respondent superior, the "master-servant" doctrine, exposed hospitals
to the risk of vicarious liability for employees' acts, 9 an important exception
remained. The current law viewed non-employee physicians as independent
contractors,' solely liable for injuries to patients under their care.' However,
courts, with the guidance of agency law, devised a theory to bridge the gap in
hospital responsibility whenever patients look to the hospital, rather than any
specific physician, as their primary health care provider.'
In Weldon v. Seminole Hospital,' a minor girl was treated in the local emergency room by her family physician. The family doctor unsuccessfully attempted to
extract a bead that was lodged in the girl's ear. Eventually, the girl was transferred
to a specialist in Oklahoma City, where the bead was removed. However, believing
that the family physician's earlier attempts had caused the permanent damage to the
girl's hearing, the parents sued the family doctor and the local hospital. This action
against the hospital was based upon theories of respondeat superior, ostensible
agency, and the hospital's independent acts of negligence.'
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held in favor of the hospital. The theory of
respondeat superior failed because the family doctor, who had staff privileges, was
not an employee of the hospital. Further, the court rejected an application of
ostensible agency. Relying on a two-part test,' the court refrained from extending
the theory of ostensible agency to render a hospital liable in the event of a

17. See Rutchik, supra note 9, at 539-40.
18. See, e.g., Gable v. Salvation Army, 100 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1940) (rejecting charitable immunity
theory's application to hospitals); see also Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957) (abandoning
charitable immunity in holding hospital vicariously liable for employee negligence).
19. For an interesting discussion of the application of the theory of respondeat superior to hospital
liability, see Arthur F. Southwick, Hospital Liability:Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED.
1, 4 (1983).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2, 220, 223 (1958); see also Pedroza v. Bryant,
677 P.2d 166, 169 QVash. 1984) (explaining court's tendency to classify staff physicians as independent
contractors).
21. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71 (5th ed.

1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-42(1966) (describing independent contractors
as an exception to the doctrine of respondent superior, because they are not under the control of the
employer).
22. See, e.g., Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding
hospital liability when patient looked to hospital and not to specific physician for care upon admission
to the emergency room); see also 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSONAN, AMERICAN LAW

OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 3-27 (Supp. 1990) (supporting ostensible agency theory in certain
situations, especially in the emergency room).
23. 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985).
24. Weldon, 709 P.2d at 1059.
25. Id. at 1061.
26. The following test was applied: (1) whether the patient sought treatment primarily from the
hospital and (2) whether the hospital paid the doctor a salary. Id. at 1060 (citing Adamski v. Tacoma
Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 975 (Wash Ct. App. 1987)).
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preexisting doctor-patient relationship
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
general rule of hospital liability for the negligence of emergency room physicians,
regardless of their status as independent contractors.' Additionally, the court

concluded that the hospital had no independent duty to supervise the individual
decisions of staff physicians.29

The increasing labor pains of expanding hospital liability signaled the birth of the
new doctrine of corp 3rate negligence." First introduced in Darlingv. Charleston
Community MemorialHospital,3 the Illinois Supreme Court established the concept
that a hospital had an independent responsibility to supervise the medical treatment

provided by its medizal staff.? Hospital liability was not founded on respondeat
superior but on the hospital's breach of a duty owed directly to the patient.33 The
court's ambiguity, however, concerning the required standard of care has led to
years of confusion, with some jurisdictions expanding corporate liability to impute

to a hospital the duty to ensure that only qualified physicians practice within its
walls.'
The jurisdictions deciding the issue have almost unanimously adopted the
doctrine,35 yet its application has been uneven. 6 Some courts have utilized the
doctrine of corporate negligence to impose upon a hospital as many as six
independent duties owed to those patients treated by staff physicians.37 Other courts

27. Id. at 1059.
28. Id. (distinguishing Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) based on
Weldon receiving treatment from her family doctor whereas Smith had no preexisting relationship with
the emergency room staff physician).
29. Il at 1061.
30. See Judith M. Kinney, Comment, Tort Law-Expansion of HospitalLiability Under the Doctrine
of "CorporateNegligence," 65 TEMPLE L. REv. 787, 787-90 (1992); see also Priestly, supra note 5, at
264-70 (describing how the theories permitting greater hospital liability culminated in the doctrine of
corporate liability).
31. 211 N.E.2d 253 (111.1965) There, an 18-year-old boy was taken to the emergency room after
suffering a broken leg. The. staff physician who was on call put the boy's leg in a cast that subsequently
cut off circulation to the knee, requiring that portion of the leg to be amputated.
32. Darling,211 N.E.2d at 257. The court recognized that the medical community already condoned
a hospital's accountability as shown by the Standards for Hospital Accreditation and the hospital's bylaws.
Id.
33. Id. at 258; see also Rosemary D. Welsh, Negligent Credentialing: Ohio Expands Hospital
Liability in the Wake of "'urgery of Love," 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 607, 616 (1994) (noting the doctrinal
origins of corporate neglig.,nce as distinct from vicarious liability). But see Blanton v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 458 (N.C. 1987) (adopting corporate negligence as an extension of
respondeat superior, rather than a distinct independent duty).
34. See Mitchell J. Nathanson, Hospital Corporate Negligence: Enforcing the Hospital'sRole of
Administrator,28 ToRT & INS. L.J. 575, 579 (1993); see also Gressel, supra note 6, at 400 (scrutinizing
the trend of adopting a form of corporate negligence which could give rise to strict hospital liability).
35. See Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hosp., 903 P.2d 263, 275 n.13 (Okla. 1995) (explaining that
at least twenty-two states have adopted corporate negligence in some form).
36. See Bales & Demro, supra note 8, at 471-85 (showing the inconsistencies in cases adopting,
rejecting, and limiting corporate negligence).
37. Some commentatcrs have listed six duties including: (1) negligence in relationship to premises,
equipment, or facilities; (2) negligence in selection or retention of physicians; (3) negligence in
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have limited its scope by imposing fewer duties," by requiring that the underlying
physician negligence have been foreseeable,39 or by adopting what some commentators have labeled a "quasi-respondeat-superior" analysis.'
In Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hospital Trust Authority,4" the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma joined those states advocating corporate negligence, yet followed
2
in limiting the type of independent duties imposed.43
Albain v. Flower HospitaP
Despite the conservative approach in reshaping the doctrine, the majority failed to
define the "pattern of incompetent behavior" by a staff physician which would
impose an independent duty upon the hospital. Thus, future applications of the
Strubhartdecision could possibly breathe new life into the unpredictable "monster"
of corporate liability.
III. Statement of the Case
Gayla Tearney was admitted to Perry Memorial Hospital to give birth under the
care of Dr. Richard Seal, the patient's private physician who had staff privileges at
the hospital.' 4 After a difficult labor and delivery with forceps at 1:30 a.m., Dr.
Seal stayed with the baby for about an hour before leaving the hospital. 5
The physician returned at 7:00 a.m. and resumed personal care of the baby.
However, by late morning or early afternoon, the baby had gone into hypovolemic

overseeing physicians; (4) failure to devise medical rules or policies; (5) negligence in devising medical
rules or policies; (6) negligence in enforcing medical rules or policies. Jim M. Perdue, DirectCorporate
Liabilityof Hospitals: A Modern Day Legal Concept of LiabilityforInjury Occurringin the Modem Day
Hospital, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 773, 773 n.2 (1983).
38. See Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990) (refusing to impose upon a
hospital a duty to supervise or monitor the activities of staff physicians, based on the rationale that
physicians and not hospitals are licensed to practice medicine).
39. See Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 163-64 (Wis. 1981).
40. See Rutchik, supra note 9, at 545 (citing Humana Medical Corp. of Ala. v. Traffanstedt, 597
So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1992) (holding that the hospital can not be liable absent a showing that the attending
staff physician was also negligent)).
41. 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
42. 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990). See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The Albain court held
that "the independent duty of the hospital is limited to the exercise of due care in the granting of staff
privileges, and the continuation of such privileges, to independent private physicians." Albain, 553
N.E.2d at 1046.
43. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 278 (citing Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1046).
44. Il at 266.

45. Id. The subsequent chain of command was the following: (1) Dr. Seal, who, although, had
returned home would resolve any disputes between Ms. Kennedy and Nurse Bowles in caring for the
baby; (2) Ms. Kennedy, a medical student; (3) Nurse Bowles, a hospital employee; and (4) a nurses aid,
who was assigned to take the baby's vital signs every fifteen minutes. At 3:45 a.m. and at 4:00 a.m.,
Nurse Bowles, concerned about the baby's condition, called Kennedy, who concluded that the baby was
"fine."
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shock, most probably as the result of the improper delivery by forceps, and had
4
47
to be transferred to a hospital in Oklahoma City. The baby died later that day.
Strubhart, as the representative of Geoffrey Tearney's estate, brought a suit
against Perry Memorial Hospital for negligence in causing the baby's death. 49
Although the judge had previously dismissed any theory of liability based on
corporate negligence,' the jury awarded the decedent's estate $800,000."' The trial
court judge, however, granted a new trial based upon the estate's refusal to remit
$500,000 of the verdict and because the hospital was prejudiced by the admission
of certain evidence.'
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision for a new trial and held
that Strubhart had not adequately preserved the issue of whether corporate
negligence is a viab',e liability doctrine in Oklahoma.53 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in part overruled the lower court, opening the door to evaluate corporate
negligence as a theory of recovery.' The present discussion focuses on the
resolution of this issue.

46. "Hypovolemia is an abnormally low volume of blood circulating in the body, which usually
follows a severe blood loss which may occur as a result of internal bleeding. It is a dangerous condition
that can lead to shock and death." Id. at 267 n.2 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N STAFF, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 564 (1989)).
47. Id. at 267.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 266. The phtintiff originally brought suit against the hospital, Dr. Seal, Ms. Kennedy, the
Oklahoma College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery. Id. at 268. The latter three claims were
dismissed before trial, after a settlement with Dr. Seal for $150,000. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 269. This evidence consisted of prior alleged bad acts of Dr. Seal which included, but was
not limited to, Dr. Seals reluctance to transfer patients to specialized facilities, incidents when his failure
to transfer resulted in infarts' deaths, violations of hospital policy, and sending a patient home without
protecting an incision with antibiotics and requiring her to undergo an additional surgery. Id. at 267-68.
This evidence was admitted, not to show the hospital's negligence in screening and reviewing the
competency of Dr. Seal, but rather to prove that the hospital employees were negligent and to impute
their negligence to the hospital based on respondeat superior. Id. at 267. the trial judge reconsidered his
earlier admission of this evidence and
was of the view that. the overwhelming nature of this testimony made it appear to the jury
that the hospital was responsible for the actions of Dr. Seal or ... made the hospital
responsible for insuring some action to be taken by hospital personnel to prevent the
treatment of the infant.
Id. However, the court also provided guidance for the admission of testimony supporting the theory of
corporate negligence on retrial.
Testimony about a doctor's prior conduct is admissible if the hospital, through its
personnel, knows or should know with the exercise of ordinary care of the prior conduct,
and the prior conduct of the doctor is such that a hospital exercising ordinary care would
take steps to either monitor or discipline the doctor.
Id. at 273. "[Sluch episodes ... of prior conduct might include the fact the doctor has previously been
sued for malpractice or experienced untoward results in prior cases." Id.
53. Id. at 269. The ccurt of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision by a 2-I vote. Id. at 269.
54. Id. at 271-74.
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Justice Lavender, as author of the majority opinion, recognized an independent
duty which hospitals owe directly to patients who are treated by staff physicians."
The court imposed a duty of ordinary care on hospitals to ensure that only
competent physicians are granted staff privileges. Further, once staff privileges are
granted, a hospital must take "reasonable steps to ensure patient safety when it
knows or should know56 the staff physician has engaged in a pattern of incompetent behavior."' Limiting the hospital's duty to the exercise of due care in
granting and renewing staff privileges, the majority presented three reasons for
adopting the doctrine of corporate negligence.
First, the public's perception of modern hospitals as businesses which provide and
coordinate comprehensive health care supports the imposition of a direct duty on the
hospital to the patient-consumer to meet an adequate standard of care in fulfilling
this administrative role.' Second, the existing law in Oklahoma foreshadowed the
further expansion of hospital responsibility, and now it was time to continue this
trend. Third, failure to impose this independent duty would permit a hospital to
ignore the incompetence of staff physicians, thereby increasing the likelihood of
patients being injured by such incompetence."
Distinguishing this form of liability from respondeat superior,' the majority
adopted an approach similar to that of Albain v. Flower Hospitalr1 and rejected
making hospitals insurers of patient safety." However, the majority in Strubhart
parted with the Albain court by refusing to place a strict duty on hospitals to
terminate staff privileges whenever a doctor's competence is called into question.'
Rather, a hospital may fulfill its independent duty by taking "some reasonable or

55. Id. For a discussion of additional duties which courts have imposed under the umbrella of
corporate negligence, see supra note 37.
56. The court repeatedly set forth the standard that the hospital "should know." On the other hand,
the court was ambiguous when stating that "the hospital can only be held liable if it had reason to know
it should have acted. Therefore, knowledge, either actual or constructive, is an essential factor in
determining whether the hospital exercises reasonable care or was negligent." Strubhart,903 P.2d at 278.
However, the "reason to know" standard is distinct from the "should know" standard. According to the
Restatement of Torts, an actor has reason to know a fact, when the actor "has information from which
a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that such fact
exists." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (1965). In contrast, the term "should know" means
that "a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence ... would ascertain the fact in question in the
performance of his duty to another .. " Id. § 12(2). The comment to this section provides that "these
two phrases ... differ in that 'reason to know' implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor,
whereas 'should know' implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in question."
57. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 275. However, the court emphasized that this "pattern of incompetence"
may consist of a single prior episode, if it is "so egregious on the part of the doctor that the hospital
should know it is dealing with an incompetent." Id. at 277 n.14.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 278.
60. Id. at 276. For a discussion of the views of respondeat superior in Oklahoma law, see I. Trotter
Hardy, Jr., When Doctrines Collide: Corporate Negligence and Respondeat Superior When Hospital
Tmployees Fail To Speak Up, 61 TUL.L. REv. 85, 85-88 (1986).
61. 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
62. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 276.
63. Id. at 277.
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appropriate steps."' Adopting this form of corporate negligence as a viable theory
of recovery upon retrial, the court remanded the case back to the trial court for a
new trial.'
IV. Reasonsfor Adopting the CorporateNegligence Doctrine
Although corporate negligence has gained widespread acceptance in the legal
community, not all have welcomed the doctrine's debut with open arms. Some
critics have argued that this new form of liability focuses more on targeting deep
pockets than on extracting a judgment from the appropriate tortfeasor.' Other
skeptics have lambasted the doctrine based on practical arguments, predicting
escalating health care costs, borne predominantly by patients. 7
In Strubhart,the court was similarly conflicted over the issue.' Three considerations, however, persuaded the majority to adopt a variation of corporate negligence.
Though each of the arguments has weaknesses, when taken together, these reasons
support the doctrine's imposition.
A. Public's Perceptionof the Modem Hospitalr
Wary of creating an epidemic of health care litigation, some courts have excused
hospitals from any responsibility for the negligent acts of staff physicians, reasoning
that "hospitals don't practice medicine, physicians do."7 However, this oft-quoted
adage no longer reflects the current public perception of healthcare facilities' The
modern hospital has voluntarily assumed the role of a profit-producing business,72
aggressively marketing itself as an administrator" and a provider of comprehensive
health care.74
The Strubhart court accurately defined the modern hospital as a "corporate
institution."" Like other corporations, hospitals in the United States funnel billions

64. Id. at 278.

65. Id. at 279.
66. See James B. Cohoon, Comment, Piercingthe Doctrineof CorporateHospital Liability, 17 SAN

DIEGO L. REv. 383, 400-01 nn.106-07 (1980).
67. See Thompson v. llason Hosp. 591 A.2d 703,709 (Pa. 1991) (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (claiming
that corporate negligence would be a monumental and ill-advised change in the law).
68. The majority's victory in adopting the corporate negligence doctrine was marginal, decided by
a 5-4 vote. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 279.
69. "The doctrine of corporate negligence reflects the public's perception of the modem hospital as
a multifaceted health care facility." Id. at 275.
70. See Hannola v. Chy of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (quoting the
trial court judge's reasoning).
71. Id. at 1190.

72. See Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992) (observing the hospital's attributes
as a business).
73. See Nathanson, suara note 34, at 592.
74. See McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(citing Thompson v. Nasor Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. 1991)).
75. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 275.
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of dollars each year into marketing strategies," targeting prospective patients and
companies whose insurance policies include the hospital in their health care plan.7
Modem hospitals recruit staff physicians who are key admitters of inpatients and
devise programs to generate referrals to specialists. 8 Further, hospitals charge
patients for many medical services, collecting from them, if necessary, by legal
action."
Aware of this corporate structure, the public has come to rely on hospitals to
provide administrative services." Of course, the law must not bend when merely
pressured to conform to public expectation. Rather, the law must adapt when a
potential tortfeasor aggressively assumes a new role and public policy dictates that
the new role should include legal duties.
B. Promoting HospitalResponsibility and Awareness in the Role of Healthcare
Coordinator'
Recognizing the modem hospital as a comprehensive healthcare corporation, the
majority in Strubhart concluded that hospitals must bear the legal responsibility
associated with this new role.' Addressing the significance of responsibility,
Lyndon Baines Johnson advised that "It]here are plenty of recommendations on how
to get out of trouble cheaply and fast. Most of them come down to this: Deny your
responsibility.' Because expanded hospital liability is neither cheap nor fast, some
opponents of corporate negligence have, likewise, rejected the doctrine.' 4
Although the dissent in Strubhart was silent in rejecting the doctrine,' other
critics contend that corporate liability would necessarily accelerate the upward spiral
of health care costs' and would excessively burden the courts with increased
malpractice litigation.' The defect in this argument is threefold. First, corporate

76. See Kashishian,481 N.W.2d at 282.
77. See JULIANN B. SULLIVAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INHOSPITAL CENTER FOR WOMEN'S
HEALTH 59-60 (1994).
78. Id. at 16-22.
79. See Frank M. McClellan, Tort Liability of Physicians, Hospitals, and Other Health Care
Providers,C972 ALI-ABA 1, 25 (1994).
80. See Nathanson, supra note 34, at 592. For instance, hospitals generally investigate credentials
before granting staff privileges, often spending 20 hours or more verifying the information for one
physicians. Mary T. Koska, Credentialing Program Demise a 'Disappointment', Hosps. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1992, at 72, available in Westlaw, 1992 WL 3256171, at *1-2. In addition,
hospitals coordinate peer review programs and institute bylaws ensuring patient safety. See Moore v.
Burt, 645 N.E.2d 749, 751-55 (Ohio CL App. 1994); see also Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 158 F.R.D
70, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (acknowledging that hospitals have bylaws and a duty to formulate, adopt, and
enforce adequate rules and policies).
81. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 276.
82. Id.
83. See Priestley, supra note 5, at 263 (quoting Lyndon Baines Johnson (Sept. 30, 1967)).
84. See Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703,709 (Pa. 1991) (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (claiming
an adoption of the doctrine will boost health care costs already burdening the public).
85. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 279 (Hodges, J., dissenting).
86. See Thompson, 591 A.2d at 709.
87. See Brian Cox, Medical Providers Exposure to Liabilities, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. &
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negligence is fault-based.' The threat of increased insurance costs, therefore,
creates an incentive to alter hospital conduct to avoid liability.9 If courts provide
hospitals with a clear standard of care, health care costs need increase only to the
extent that is required to maintain the increased standard.
Second, the prospect of gaining a reputation as "the malpracticing hospital" would
prompt hospitals to adjust their behavior, terminating or reducing the staff privileges
for physicians reasonably known to be incompetent.' Third, the hospital must bear
the responsibility when breaching the duties associated with the administrative role
it has assumed, independent of economic and efficiency considerations. 9
Therefore, corporate negligence places legal responsibility on the party who both
has actively assumed a role performing the required duties and has the ability to
improve their performance to avoid liability. The practical result of imposing this
form of liability could be greater caution in screening and coordinating peer reviews
of physicians before granting or renewing staff privileges.
Corporate negligence, as adopted by the Strubhart court, does not require a
hospital to bear all responsibility for the negligence of staff physicians.' Rather,
this doctrine requires that a hospital bear responsibility only when a patient is
injured because of the hospital's negligence in granting or continuing to extend staff
privileges to physicians reasonably known to be incompetent. The Strubhart form
of corporate negligence does not encompass hospital liability for the negligent acts
of those physicians who have not previously exhibited a "pattern of incompetent
'
behavior."93
In effect, the Strubhartholding recognized the hospital's role as an administrator
in overseeing paer r.view, but not as a supervisor which would second-guess all
physicians' medical decisions.' Of course, advocates of expanded hospital liability
could argue that the hospital's role as a provider and protector of patient care does
in fact include the responsibilities of making policies and supervising all medical
decisions taking place within its walls. Nevertheless, the policy of promoting

CAsUALTY-RISK & BENEM-TS MGMT., Nov. 22, 1993, at 2, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 3029396, at
*2.

88. Strubhart,903 P,2d at 275.
89. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1984) (theorizing that imposing corporate
negligence would have economic incentives, which would keep down the rising costs of insurance).
90. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1499, 1522-23 (1991). Addressing
the "incentives to police the conduct of independent contractor physicians," the author noted that "[a]
hospital does not want to gain the reputation that its patients are more commonly the victims of
malpractice than patients elsewhere." Id.; see also Pauline Martin Rosen, Medical StaffPeer Review:
Qualifying the Qualified PrivilegeProvision, 27 LOY. L.A. REV. 357, 392 (1993). "The hospital has an
interest in protecting its own reputation and ensuring quality patient care; indeed it is legally obligated
to prevent incompetent doctors from practicing at its facilities." Id.
91. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376,1382-84 (Alaska 1987) (applying analogy of responsibility
of the common carrier to justify imposing a responsibility on the hospital when undertaking to operate
a new program as an integral part of its health care enterprise).
92. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 277.
93. lad
at 278.

94. Id
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hospital responsibility is tempered by permitting liability only to expand commensurate to the hospital's expanded role.
95
C. Precedent of IncreasingHospital Liability Proportionateto Hospital Role

During the last fifty-five years, Oklahoma courts have systematically dismantled
the stronghold of hospital immunity.' In Strubhart,the majority acknowledged the
trend of hospital liability, citing cases in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
imposed a duty upon the hospital to ensure the competence of staff physicians in
certain situations. The majority correctly recognized that it was time to adopt
corporate negligence.
The majority cited Weldon v. Seminole Municipal Hospital" as foreshadowing
the adoption of corporate negligence in some form.' In that case, the court cited
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,1" the decision first
recognizing an independent duty of hospitals to their patients. In determining
whether the hospital had neglected to properly supervise the diagnosis and course
of action by a staff physician, the Weldon court "looked to a hospital's role and the
amount of control it possesses over the care rendered to a patient...... The staff
physician was the patient's family doctor and had an established doctor-patient
relationship. As a result, the court concluded that the hospital did not have a duty
to oversee the doctor's independent medical decisions."
The court in Weldon acknowledged the doctrine of corporate responsibility but
refrained from applying it to the facts of that case. However, the hospital's
negligence in granting or continuing the doctor's staff privileges was not at issue.
Further, the evidence did not indicate that the staff physician had demonstrated a

95. Id. at 275.
96. Charitable immunity was abolished in Oklahoma in 1940. Gable v. Salvation Army, 100 P.2d
244, 244 (Okla. 1940). The modem-day hospital has continually redefined its role, and courts,
consequently, have enlarged the boundaries of hospital liability. When the hospital achieved profitproducing status and exercised control over its employees, the courts applied respondeat superior. See
Smith, supra note 3, at 447; SHERYL L. RAY, EVALUATING OKLAHOMA HOsPrrALs' CRITERIA FOR
ASSESSING RECOVERING PHYSICIANS RISKS 11 (1992). As the hospital further grew into the role of
primary healthcare provider and established the emergency room, courts permitted patients to recover
under ostensible agency. See, e.g., Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983)
(estopping hospital from denying responsibility for the alleged negligence of its independent contractors
in the emergency room as ostensible agents). For a more recent case applying agency theory, see Weldon
v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Okla. 1985).
97. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 275 (citing Weldon v. Seminole Mon. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1061
(Okla. 1985) (affirming the theory of ostensible agency but holding the hospital not liable when a
preexisting doctor-patient relationship is proved); Hillcrest Medical Ctr. v. Wier, 373 P.2d 45, 48 (Okla.
1962) (holding the hospital must exercise ordinary care when patient is left by private physician in the
general care of hospital personnel)). At each phase in hospital development, the courts have responded
by applying a theory of liability suitable to the evolving role of the hospital.
98. 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985).
99. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 276 n.12.
100. 211 N.E.2d 253 (II1. 1965).
101. Weldon, 709 P.2d at 1061.
102. Id.
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pattern of prior incompetence. Thus, the application of corporate negligence in
Strubhart did not contradict the court's reasoning in previous cases.
The doctrine of corporate negligence may be viewed as an expansion of hospital
liability analogous to the expanded liability adopted in previous cases. Ostensible
agency and respondeat superior were both accepted based upon the expanding role
of the hospital." Iherefore, corporate negligence may be interpreted as both a
distinct doctrine as well as a natural progression of the policies supporting
Oklahoma precedenL
V. Ramifications of Applying the Strubhart Form Of CorporateNegligence
The scope of the corporate negligence doctrine is determined by the dimensions
of the burdens of proof, the duties imposed, and the guidelines defining these duties.
A. Scope of Duties Imposed
In general, courts have divided the duties embodying this doctrine into the
following four categories: (1) a duty to use reasonable care in granting and in
continuing staff privileges; (2) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of
safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (3) a duty to formulate, adopt, and
enforce adequate rules and policies which ensure quality care for patients; and (4)
a aluty to oversee and supervise all staff physicians who practice medicine within
the facility." 4 In Strubhart, the form of corporate negligence adopted encompassed
only the first category of these duties."' The majority remained silent concerning
the second category, suggested but did not impose the third," and expressly
rejected the fourth."'1
The majority's failure to address the duty of safely maintaining hospital facilities
and equipment is negligible."e The Strubhart majority's failure to formally adopt
the third category of duties was possibly more calculated. Upon a showing that the
hospital formulated safety rules and policies, an injured patient may be barred from
recovery." However, an injured patient may still not recover damages, even when
proving that the hospital failed to meet this standard of care."' Therefore, the

103. For a discussion of the development of ostensible agency, see Nathanson, supra note 34, at
576. For a discussion of the development of respondeat superior, see Priestly, supra note 5, at 263-64.
104. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991).
105. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 276.
106. Id. at 277 n.14 (citing Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707).
107. Id. at 277.
108. Traditional to,'t law long ago imposed premises liability upon all commercial entities.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1967). Courts, in turn, have imposed this form of liability

upon hospitals since the abolition of charitable immunity. See Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d
193, 194-96 (Pa. 1965) (recognizing that the court's desire to hold hospitals accountable for improperly
maintained facilities wa, a strong force behind abolishing charitable immunity).
109. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 277 n.14 (citing Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa.
1991)).
110. Because the farm of corporate negligence imposed did not expressly include the duty to
formulate, adopt, and enforce rules and policies which ensure the safety of patients. Id. at 75-76.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss4/7

19951

NOTES

court denied that the hospital owes its patients the duty to formulate safety rules,
yet also noted that a hospital's formulation of such rules could be a defense to
liability. Consequently, the court narrowed the circumstances giving rise to hospital
liability, while also providing hospitals with an incentive to formulate rules and
policies which ensure that only competent doctors are selected and retained on staff.
Similarly, the majority indicated that the hospital's duty might be satisfied by
requiring some type of supervision of the physician in certain circumstances, yet
refused to impose the supervision of staff as a hospital duty in all individual
cases."' However, the court suggested that a hospital may be liable in some cases
in which the staff physician was not incompetent at all."' The court noted that a
hospital should be required to take reasonable alternative action in individual cases
where the prior incompetence of the staff doctor is not an issue, if the hospital
personnel:
1) knows that a staff physician's diagnosis or treatment is below medical
standards, or 2) the diagnosis or treatment is so obviously negligent as
to lead any reasonable person to anticipate substantial injury would3
result to the patient from following the doctor's course of treatment."
Confusingly, the court's view that the hospital could be liable in such circumstances contradicts the court's express holding that the hospital is not "required to
constantly supervise and second-guess the activities of its physicians, beyond the
duty to remove a known incompetent."" 4 By explicitly rejecting this fourth
category of duties, the majority shut the door on the prospect of strict hospital
liability for the negligent acts of staff physicians."5 Imposing a duty upon
hospitals to adequately supervise and oversee the staff, however, does not
necessarily lead to unbounded liability." 6 Outlining adequate guidelines for
supervision might have served to prevent the possibility of the reckless expansion
of hospital liability"7 rather than eliminating the duty to supervise staff.

I11. Id. at 277.

112. Id. at 278 n.15.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 276.
115. Id. (citing Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045-46 (Ohio 1990)); see also Purcell
v. Zimbleman, 500 P.2d 335, 343-45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding hospital is on notice when pattern
of incompetence is discoverable but has no duty to monitor all medical decisions). See generally Patratos
v. Markakis, 637 N.E.2d 13, 14-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (placing no duty on hospital to constantly
supervise all medical decisions of all the staff).
116. See Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 158 F.R.D. 70, 72-74 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing that
hospitals in Pennsylvania may be sued for negligently falling to oversee its staff doctors). For a
justification of imposing this duty as part of corporate negligence, see Nathanson, supra note 34, at 59192 (citing Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriersto Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 451 (1988)).
117. See Coleman v. Bessemer Carraway Methodist Ctr., 589 So. 2d 703, 704 (Ala. 1991) (looking
to JCAH and hospital bylaws to create a clear standard of care for supervising staff physicians); see also
Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168-70 (Wash. 1984) (applying the JCAH guidelines to objectively
define the parameters of supervising staff physicians).
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B. Scope of Burdens of Proof
Relying on the St.rubhartdecision, a court could require a plaintiff to prove the
following: (1) the hospital owed a duty to the patient, determined by whether the
patient's injury was foreseeable in light of the hospital's failure to exercise due care
in selecting and retaining medical staff;... (2) the patient was injured; 9 and (3)
the hospital's breach was the proximate cause of the patient's injury, determined by
whether the injury would not have happened "but for""' the hospital's negligence
and whether the doctor was proven to be negligent. 2'
According to these requirements, a plaintiff would be restricted from suing the
hospital when the staff physician alone was negligent. The consequences of
imposing these burdens of proof, especially that of foreseeability, could be to keep
strict liability for staff negligence at arms length, regardless of the types of duties
assumed by the hospital. Likewise, courts imposing more duties upon the hospital
have generally required greater burdens of proof."
C. Scope of Guidelines
In Strubhart,the majority identified a hospital's standard of care to fulfill its duty
of investigating a medical staff applicant's qualifications." However, the court did
not clearly define the guidelines for determining what constitutes a pattern of
physician incompetence once a physician has been granted staff privileges."
Those guidelines mentioned to illustrate how a hospital satisfies the duty could be
interpreted as contradictory.
For instance, the majority identified three types of behavior by staff physicians
which would trigger the hospital's duty. First, if the hospital knew or should have
known about a physician's "pattern of incompetent behavior," then the hospital
would be under a duty to take "reasonable action."'" Depending on the facts of

118. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 273 (citing Purcell v. Zimbleman, 500 P.2d 335,342-44 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972)). Foreseeability is generally proven by showing the hospital had actual or constrictive knowledge
of the incompetence, by a pattern or particularly egregious episode of physician negligence. See Tucson
Medical Ctr. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (Ariz. 1976) (finding that hospital must know or should have
known to be liable); Altain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990) (requiring actual or
constructive knowledge). Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 172 (Wis. 1981)
(requiring proof of foreseeability).
119. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWAR'ffS CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 131 (9th ed. 1994).
120. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 276.
121. See Humana v. Traffanstedt, 597 So. 2d 667, 670-73 (Ala. 1992) (requiring some underlying
negligent act of the doctar or other staff member); see also Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr.
156, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that attending staff physician must have been negligent to find
hospital liable). But see Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 993-95 (Ohio 1993) (holding claims against
doctor and hospital to be separate, thus, no doctor negligence need be shown to find hospital liable).
122. See Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703,707 (Pa. 1991) (holding that plaintiff must show
that the negligence was a substantial factor in the patient's injury).
123. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 276.
124. Id. at 277.
125. Id.
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the individual case, reasonable action might include total termination of staff
privileges, "lesser steps than total or full termination," or no steps toward limitation
of privileges.'"
Second, "one prior episode of physician misconduct" may be so egregious that
the hospital should know that it is dealing with an incompetent physician.'27 In
such a case, the hospital would be under a duty to take "reasonable steps to ensure
patient safety" with regard to the physician's staff privileges." 2 However, the court
failed to suggest what "reasonable steps" the hospital could take to avoid liability.
Third, the majority suggested that a hospital may be liable in some situations in
which the staff physician was not incompetent at all. 29 The hospital could be
under a duty to "take reasonable alternative action" if the physician's treatment is
known to be "below acceptable medical standards" or is "obviously negligent."'3
The majority left the issue of whether a hospital has met its standard of care in
the hands of the jury,' but neglected to impose an objective standard by which
it may be measured. At the most, the majority mentioned that a hospital has a duty
to reveal a pattern of incompetence through its peer review process.'32 However,
the majority stopped short of defining the steps to be taken once incompetence is
discovered.
In an attempt to avoid "putting a straightjacket on hospitals,"'3 the majority has
exposed hospitals to the risk of inconsistently imposed liability. Just as a
straightjacket restrains those who may do harm to themselves or others,"
objective yet flexible guidelines must be imposed to bind against unfettered liability.
D. Application of Strubhart
Combining the variables of duties, burdens of proof, and guidelines, the Strubhart
form of corporate negligence permits the construction of a doctrinal framework of
odd proportions. The majority narrowly restricted the duties which may be imposed,
moderately defined the burdens of proof, and yet provided a shifting plumbline by
which to measure the standard of care. Because of the fact-specific guidelines, 3
courts in the future could rely on Strubhartto liberally impose hospital liability for
cases concerning negligence in staff selection or retention.
In applying this form of corporate negligence to the facts of Strubhart, the
plaintiff will have little difficulty proving Dr. Seal's negligence in establishing

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 278 n.15.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 277.
132. Id.; see MARCIA MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST CuT: LIFE IN THE BACKROOMS OF MEDICINE 2642 (1978); see also SPENCER VIBBERT, THE DOCTOR WATCHERS passim (1991) (describing the policing
of medicine in the United States).
133. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 277.
134. See TABOR'S CYCLOPEDIA MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1636 (15th ed. 1985).
135. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 277.
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proximate cause.'36 The more critical issue will be in establishing a pattern of
incompetence of Dr. Seal or that the hospital knew or had reason to know of his
incompetence.'37 Tle result at retrial, then, would turn on what guidelines the
court uses to measure both Dr. Seal's medical competence and the hospital's
administrative competence.
VI. Alternative Guidelines in Determining a Consistently
Imposed Standard of Care
"Accountability to the public, through assurance of competent care to patients by
physicians and other health care professionals is a paramount responsibility of
organized medicine."'' The form of corporate negligence adopted in Strubhartis
a step in the direction of greater hospital accountability to patients. However, the
majority neglected to specify a new standard of care proportional to this new form
of liability.'39
Whether this lack of specificity will create uncertainty for Oklahoma hospitals
remains to be seen. Hospitals' complaints about uncertain liability may be more
justifiable in states adopting a more expansive form of corporate negligence. For
instance, in Pennsylvania, a hospital owes a duty to its patients to supervise all
medical decisions of staff physicians practicing medicine within the facility. 4 Not
surprisingly, the hospitals in these states may not be sure how to protect themselves
against liability when an otherwise competent staff doctor injures a patient.
Additionally, unlike Oklahoma, some states have adopted a version of corporate
liability which impcses upon hospitals the duty to formulate and enforce rules and
policies to ensure patient safety. Quite naturally, the hospitals in these states might
complain about the uncertainty of liability when failing to have adequate bylaws,
policies, or committees.
In comparison, the duty imposed on Oklahoma hospitals under the doctrine of
corporate negligence is limited to granting staff privileges to competent doctors and
to taking reasonable steps when a staff physician has engaged in a pattern of
incompetent behavior. 4' Thus, the lack of specific guidelines which a hospital

136. The hospital's defense had previously focused on proving the doctor's negligence, and medical
experts had testified that Dr. Seal's standard of care fell below the accepted standard. Id. at 268. The
accepted standard is the practice ordinarily employed in similar situations. Id. at 278 n.17 (citing Rogers
v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 651 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla. 1982) (rejecting locality rule)),
137. The plaintiff produced no witnesses to show medical mismanagement, and only one expert
witness had labeled Dr. Seal as a "problem doctor." Id. at 268. Justice Lavender indicated that at least
one of these episodes was clearly not relevant to Dr. Seal's competence as a physician. Id. The court
may have been following the reasoning of Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990)
(disregarding non-technical physician negligence such as tardiness in proving hospital liability).
138. Council onMental Health, The SickPhysician: Impairment by PsychiatricDisorders,Including
Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, 223 JAMA 684, 684 (1973).
139. The court preferred to leave the standard of care as a matter to be determined according to the
circumstances by the jury. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 276.
140. See Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707-08 (Pa. 1991).
141. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 276.
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could apply to avoid liability may not create the same degree of uncertainty as those
jurisdictions adopting a broader form of corporate negligence. Nevertheless, the
Strubhartdecision failed to define "pattern of incompetence" and provided no clear
path of "reasonable steps" for a hospital to follow in responding to physician
incompetence. Instead, the court left these issues to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.'42
As in Strubhart, other courts have attempted to enact a fact-specific system of
accountability. 43 In Gonzalez v. Nork,'" the California Superior Court rejected
an application of guidelines by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH, now the JCAHO),"45 leaving the decision to the courts."4 However, the
practical effect of such flexibility has been that, even if hospitals diligently have met
national standards for accreditation, they are still exposed to the risk of liability.
Some commentators have even advised that the type of standard applied may be
irrelevant as long as the same standards are applied consistently. 47
Elam v. College Park Hospital,'48 a more recent decision out of the California
courts, determined that the standards of care arose from both the state statutes and
the national standards of accreditation, as well as the hospital's role as a comprehensive health center.'49 Likewise, the courts of other jurisdictions have looked to the
JCAHO for guidance in establishing a standard of care. 5 Other courts have
applied some of the elements of the JCAHO's guidelines, such as hospital
bylaws' or peer reviews" as the standard of care.
In the future, courts applying the Strubhartdoctrine of corporate negligence will
be afforded discretion in determining the standard of care for a narrow category of
duties. The result could be inconsistency in the manner in which the courts impose

142. Id. at 277.

143. See, e.g., Johnson v. Misercordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 171 (Wis. 1981)
(holding the standard of care for corporate negligence is the traditional standard of tort law, ordinary care
under the circumstances).
144. No. 228566 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County 1973) (criticizing the JCAH standards but not
adopting any remedial standards as a substitute).
145. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) is now known as the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). For the 1995 manual containing
these guidelines, see 1 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION FOR HEALTHCARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOsPrrALs (1994).
146. Rutchik, supra note 9, at 563.
147. See Rutchik, supra note 9, at 555.
148. 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
149. See William B. Smith, Hospital Liability for PhysiciansNegligence, 251 JAMA 448 (1984)

(citing Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163)).
150. See Rodriques v. Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456, 459 (R.I. 1993) (finding hospital not liable
when adhering to guidelines of hospital bylaws and JCAH, regardless of doctor negligence); Bays v. St.
Lukes Hosp., 825 P.2d 319, 323 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that evidence of JCAH noncompliance
could be admissible for showing breached standard of care when proving hospital liability).
151. See Pedrozav. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170-71 (Wash. 1984) (applying JCAH and hospital's own
bylaws as standard).
152. See Moore v. Burt, 645 N.E.2d 749, 755 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding negligently performed
peer review as breach of standard of care).
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hospital liability.' One alternative is adopting the JCAHO's guidelines as the new
standard of care. Although some courts have criticized these guidelines as too
vague, the JCAHO standards comprise an objective framework by requiring, for
example, hospital bylaws, an administrative governing board, and peer reviews."
However, the scope of the JCAHO standards is broader than the duties imposed
in Strubhart. Thus, if a court were attempting to create a standard of care
proportional to the duty imposed under corporate responsibility, only the JCAHO
guidelines addressing the hospital's discipline of incompetent doctors would be
applicable. Alternatively, the court could adopt the JCAHO standards and expand
the doctrine of corporate negligence to include a broader range of duties. For
example, in the future courfs could impose upon hospitals the duties to establish
rules and policies ensuring patient care or to oversee and supervise the independent
medical decisions of staff physicians.
With regard to these types of guidelines, the majority only mentions that a
hospital may be liable if a pattern of incompetence develops which the hospital
should have become aware of through its peer review process.155 Because peer
review programs are mandated in almost every state by statute,'6 courts could
interpret Strubhart a. imposing a standard of care as defined by state statutes. In
addition, Justice Lavender notes the opinion's accord with title 63, section 1-707b
of the Oklahoma Statutes.'5
This statute, however, requires only that the governing board of each hospital
adopt standards for use in determining staff privileges.' It does not provide a
uniform standard of care for all hospitals. Until a uniform standard is developed,
applying the Strubhart doctrine of corporate negligence could expose hospitals to
inconsistent judgments and patients to increased insurance premiums.159

153. One significant contributor to this problem is the inconsistency in how hospitals deal with
impaired physicians. One study predicts that 14-15% of physicians at some point in their career will be
impaired, either mentally or due to substance addition. RAY, supra note 96, at 7. Some courts have
resolved the dilemma of protecting patients and rehabilitating physicians by meeting JCAHO standards
and using a Psychiatrist's orother health professional's evaluations in determining whether staff privileges
should be reinstated. See Rembis v. Anderson, No. 90-35852, 1991 WL 206319, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
15, 1991).
154. See Rutchik, supra note 9, at 566-70. Other suggestions are application of the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). Id. But see RAY, supra note 96, at 41 (reporting that 84% of Oklahoma
hospitals surveyed claim that the NPDB has not altered the process used by hospitals in dealing with
physician incompetence).
155. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 277.
156. Murray S. Monroe, Health Care: CurrentAntitrust Issues, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 365, 389 (1993)

(noting that at that time -,8 states had statutes providing for peer review).
157. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 277.
158. Id.
159. See Rutchik, supra note 9, at 562-64 (discussing the probable consequences of inconsistent
standards of care for corporate negligence).
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VII. Conclusion
The trend of expanding hospital liability has reached its current zenith in the
doctrine of corporate negligence. In Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hospital,
Oklahoma joined the growing number of jurisdictions imposing this independent
duty on hospitals to protect patients from the acts of negligent physicians. However,
the Strubhart majority created a plateau of hospital liability by limiting the scope
of these duties to encompass only the exercise of due care in granting and
continuing staff privileges.
Despite this restriction, the majority failed to lay clear boundaries in establishing
a new standard of care proportional to this new duty. Without clear guidelines,
courts in the future could struggle with this issue, possibly leaving the apparent
plateau of hospital liability to fade into a mirage.
One solution may be to look to the national standards for disciplinary actions of
incompetent doctors, as set forth by the JCAHO. These annually updated standards
provide objective yet flexible guidelines by which to measure the hospital's standard
of care. Such guidance could enable courts to both protect patients against the
negligence of known incompetents and protect hospitals against the risk of uncertain
liability.
However, without specific guidelines, Oklahoma courts must let the jury decide
whether the hospital has met its standard of care in taking "reasonable action" 1"
to protect patients from injury by habitually negligent or otherwise incompetent staff
physicians. In Strubhart, a divided Oklahoma Supreme Court may have attempted
to tame the "monster" of hospital liability, but in the end, the creature merely
assumed the conflicted nature of its creator.
JeanniePinkston

160. Strubhart, 903 P.2d at 277.
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